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TWO MEN AND A PLANK
Claire Oakes Finkelstein*
l'.

University of Pennsylvania Law School

I. INTRODUCTION
Can two individuals, each of whom needs a certain resource for his survival,
have equal and con flicting rights to that resource? If so, is each entitled to
try to exclude the other from its use ? An old chestnut of moral and legal
philosophy raises the problem. Following a shipwreck, two men converge
simultaneously on a plank floating in the sea. There is no other plank�
available and no immediate hope of rescue . Unfortunately the plank can
support only one; it sinks if two try to cling to it. Is it permissible for each
to attempt to secure his own survival by pushing the other off the plank?
The example first appears in the writing of the Roman stoic Hecato n ,
who takes the position that the men are obligated t o draw lots. It is permis
sible to push the other off the plank only if he has received the short straw
in a lottery and refuses to cede his place.1 Cicero is next to take up the
problem , followed by Grotius, both of whom disagree with Hecaton. They
maintain that the duty to avoid inflicting harm on ano ther outweighs the
entitlement to fight for one ' s survival . They think it is not permissible to
push the other off the plank even if he has drawn the short straw in a
lottery. 2 By the time we come to Pufendorf, however, we have reached
precisely the opposite conclusion from Cicero and Grotius, and indeed
have moved far beyond Hecaton. Pufendorf advances the general proposi
tion that "If two men are in immediate danger of both perishing, one is
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I wish to thank the participants of
the conference at the Institute for Law and Philosophy of the University of Pennsylvania,where
this paper was first presented, as well as members of the audience of the Social and Political
Theory Group of the Australian National University, and the Philosophy Department at
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. Special thanks to Leo Katz, Phillip Montague, Philip
Petit, and Gopal Sreenivasan for their comments on various drafts and for conversations on
the topic of this article.
L Hecaton, MoralDuties, in CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. III, xxiii. (trans. Walter Miller, Harvard
University Press 1913, rpt. 1975)
2. /d. The Loeb translation of the relevant passage in Cicero is as follows: "Hecaton gives the
argument on both sides of the question; but in the end it is by the standard of expediency, as
he conceives it,rather than by one of human feeling, that he decides the question of duty." See
also bk. III,vi,§ 29, where Cicero suggests that a wise man may not steal food from a worthless
man,even if the wise man would otherwise perish of hunger.
For GROTIUS, see THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (trans. A. C. Campbell, Hyperion Press
1979) ch. II, § viii,where he says that where two individuals are in an equal state of necessity,
and neither has priority over the other, the "plea of necessity" does not furnish an excuse.
*
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allowed to do anything to hasten the death of the other (since the other
would perish anyway) in order to save himself. "3 Moreover, Pufendorf
thinks that

even if one has drawn the

short straw in a lottery, one is entitled

to resist being pushed off the plank when the other attempts to enforce the
bargain. The plank problem has shifted from a problem of distribution to
one of individual right.
The rights-based approach finds its way into subsequent reflection on the
nature of the legal defense available to a defendant under these circum
stances. Both Bacon and Blackstone are inclined to see pushing the other
off the plank as justified. Both appear to agree with Pufendorf that, as
Bacon puts it, "necessity carrieth a privilege in itself, " and that one who
pushes the other off the plank is entitled to do so. 4 They disagree only about
the nature of the justification at issue. Bacon makes the strange suggestion
that the privilege here is similar to self-defense but

stronger. 5

contrast, thinks that pushing the other off the plank is a

Blackstone, by

kind

of self-de

fense.6 But both think there is an entitlement to push the other off the
plank, a privilege that allows an agent fully to justify, not merely excuse, his
doing so.
It is not until Kant, however, that we come to the modern position on the
plank problem. On the modern view, the problem is removed from the
realm of right and becomes a problem in the theory of punishment instead.
According to Kant, neither has the right to push the other off the plank,
because such an act can never be consistent with the moral law. His brief
argument is that if it

were permissible,

the doctrine of Right would be "in

contradiction with itself."7 He gives no further explanation, but it is not
hard to see what he has in mind. If there were a right to kill out of necessity,
the victim would have a right to resist, for he has done nothing to merit the
attack. The attacker, in turn, would have a right to resist the victim's
self-defense, since he too is acting on a claim of right. The problem with
allowing a right to kill out of necessity, then, is that each may be rightfully
opposed even when acting with right. Any moral law that produced this
result seems to simultaneously endorse and condemn, permit and prohibit,
3. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE Du1Y OF MAN AND CITIZEN AccoRDING TO NATURAL LAW, Bk. I,
§§ 20-1 (ed.James Tully, Cambridge University Press 1991)
4. THE WoRKS OF FRANCIS BACON 343 (Shedding, Ellis & Heath eds., 1859). Bacon concludes
that "if a man steals viands to satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor larceny."
5. Bacon might have been driven to this position by the awkward legal status of self-defense:
"So if divers be in danger of drowning by the casting away of some boat or barge, and one of
them get to some plank, or on the boat's side to keep himself above water, and another to save
his life thrust him from it, whereby he is drowned, this is neither se defendendo nor by
misadventure, but justifiable." The problem was that se defendendo and per infortunium were still
extrajudicial in Bacon's time, in the sense that a defendant wishing to avail himself of either
of them could do so only by way of royal pardon.
6. He explains this curious position by saying that "their both remaining on the same weak
plank is a mutual, though innocent, attempt upon, and an endangering of, each other's life."
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *186.
7. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs ( trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge University
Press 1991). app. ii, 235.

•
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a given act. Kant therefore concludes that neither man on the plank has a
right to push the other off it.
Nevertheless, Kant thinks that although there is no moral right to push
one ' s fellow off the plank, there can be no legal punishment for doing so.
He says:

[T] here can be no penal law that would assign the death penalty to someone
in a shipwreck who, in order to save his own life, shoves another, whose life
is equally in danger, off a plank on which he has saved himself. For the
punishment threatened by the law could not be greater than the loss of his
own life. A penal law of this sort could not have the effect intended, since a
threat of an evil that is still uncertain (death by a judicial verdict) cannot
outweigh the fear of an evil that is certain (drowning). Hence the deed of
saving one's life by violence is not to be judged inculpable (inculpabile) but only
unpunishable (impunibile), and by a strange confusion jurists take this subjective
impunity to be objective impunity (conformity with law).8

There are several problems with Kant's argument in this passage , but they
are not presently of concern to us. 9 What is of concern is the distinction
Kant implicitly draws between the culpability of a deed and its punishability.
This distinction is variously expressed as that between conduct rules and
decision rules, or more familiarly, between justifications and excuses. What
someone does by right, or according to rules of conduct, he is justified in
doing. A person who is excused, by contrast, has no such clai m . He is merely
shown mercy, but the act is still prohibited, and he is still guilty. The crucial
move Kant makes is to say that pushing the other off the plank cannot exist
in the realm of right, since an assignment of right must be consistent. If
such an act is to be exempt from punishment, it can only be by mercy or
excuse , never by right or justification.
In law, the treatment of plank-type cases as involving at best an excuse has
become standard as well. The House of Lords endorsed it, for example , in
the famous case of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens. IO The Lords expressed
their sympathy for the defendants, who had killed and eaten the ship 's
cabin boy after spending many days stranded in a lifeboat following a
shipwreck. But the judges concluded that the law could do nothing for

8.

/d. at §§235-236.
9. In brief, the problems are as follows. First, Kant's argument that necessitous killing
cannot be deterred is a dubious one. There are punishments worse than death, and one need
only threaten to inflict them with sufficient certainty to induce compliance in a rational agent.
Second, his claim that undeterrable conduct ought not to be punished is problematic. Why
should the State fail to punish an individual to the full extent he deserves just because his evil
conduct was inevitable, given his strong, self-interested motivation? That seems an unduly
utilitarian consideration for a retributive theory of punishment. Admittedly, if it were literally
impossible for a person to conform his behavior to the law, one might feel punishment was
unwarranted. But presumably a person of goodwill could conform to a penal law with moral
content, even if this required him to act in the face of compelling considerations of self
interest.
10. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
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them. There is no principle, they said, that would exonerate a defendant
who kills someone not presently threatening him for the sake of preserving
his own life . They considered, but quickly rejected, Bacon ' s position that
"necessity carrieth a privilege in itself." But having closed the front door on
Bacon's approach, they let it in the back, by suggesting that the Crown
pardon the defendants on precisely the grounds they had rejected in law.II
In short, the modern approach allows a defense of necessity under these
circumstances, but it does so by relegating the defense to the domain of
pardon, a showing of mercy rather than an assertion of right.I2
The history of our problem suggests that the modern approach to rights
did not so much settle the plank example as find itself driven to a certain
solution by worries about inconsistency. I think there are good reasons,
however, to allow that each has a right to push the other off the plank. First,
it is not clear that Kant is correct that recognizing conflicting rights makes
morality inconsistent. Second, what if morality is, after all, inconsistent? We
cannot proceed by si n1ply eliminating that possibility ab initio, at least not if
0unds for structuring notions such as right and duty
we also have goocl
.. ately lead to inconsistency. For both of these reasons,
in the ways that Kant's claim sr ·tu:; to require reexamination .
In Section II, I offer reasons for thinking the plank case a conflict of
,,

rights. By this I tnean that each is fully entitled, not merely excused, to push
the other off the plank. I also mean that each has a right, and not merely a
liberty, to do so. Once the thesis of conflicting rights is in place, I confront,
in Section III, the suggestion that the recognition of conflicting rights
makes morality inconsistent, and I attempt to identify the assumptions that
lead to that conclusio n . In Section IV, I take up the problem of inconsis
tency in the context of so-called "moral dilemmas. " Just as Kant argued that
to admit conflicting rights would make the moral law inconsistent, many
have argued that to recogni ze the possibility of conflicting obligations
would do the same. I argue in favor of one of the solutions that has been
proposed to the problem of inconsistency in the context of moral dilem
mas. In Section V, I atten1pt to make that solution applicable to the problem
of conflicts of rights. I conclude that allowing that each has a right to push
the other off the p lank does not force us to think that morality is inconsis
tent. Finally in Section VI, I consider briefly what agents faced with a conflict
of rights ought to do. For it is one thing to show that evenly balanced
conflicts do not violate the rules of logic ; it is quite another to see how to
respond to conflicts of this sort. I argue that because any solution to such a

11. The Queen obliged, commuting their sentences to a six month prison term for each.
12. In contemporary jurisprudence, the pardon power is now judicial (as well as executive),
and is built into the structure of what are usually thought of as "excuses." The excuses, however,
retain their character as individualized concessions of mercy. George Fletcher, for example,
insists that justifications are distinguishable from excuses by the fact that justified acts are
"objectively right." Excused acts, by contrast, remain wrongful, and thus the grounds for
exoneration must operate by way of mercy rather than right. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW§ 10.1 (Boston: Little, Brown 1978) .
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what a person in such

a conflict does.
My argument that it is possible for rights to be equal and opposing
without rendering morality inconsistent thus takes a distinct position in the
history of the plank problem: I side with Pufendorf, Bacon, and Blackstone
against the House of Lords and Kant. That is, I think a person who will
otherwise die has the right to kill another, where the other is equally
endangered and has no stronger claim of right, if by doing so he can save
his own life. This paper attempts to show that this simple and appealing way
of thinking of conflicting entitlements has been wrongly dismissed by mod
ern rights theory because of an incorrect understanding of the require
ments of consistency in the theory of rights and obligations.

II. WHY THE PLANK CASE IS A CONFLICT OF R I G HTS
Before Kant raised the specter of inconsistency, the prevailing under
standing of rights positively endorsed conflicts. We see this with Pufendorf,
who inherited his permissive approach to conflicts of rights from Hobbes.
Hobbes would have readily assented to the proposition that each man
clinging to the plank has a right to push the other off it.l3 Admittedly, it
is precisely because he thought that rights could conflict that Hobbes is
often charged with lacking the concept of a right altogether and with
labeling as "rights" what are really only liberties.14 But whatever the truth
about Hobbes, we need not be restricted to seeing conflicts in terms of
conflicting liberties. I shall instead adapt Hobbes to my own purposes and
explore the possibility that full-blowiJ. claim-rights can conflict. In this sec
tion, I shall argue that each man clinging to the plank has a right, not
just a liberty, to push the other off it, and that these conflicting rights can
be in perfect equipoise. We will then consider the implications of this
conclusion for the theory of rights and duties.
Before I turn to the argument for conflicting claim-rights in this case, I
wish to explain why I do not think we should treat each man on the plank
as having a mere liberty to push the other off. The model for conflicting
liberties is the case of economic competitors struggling over market share.
Each does things to harm the other as the only way to help himself, but
neither has a right that the other refrain from doing such things. But
struggling over the plank is not like struggling over market share, for one
13. This is clear, among other things, from his repeated suggestion that while the sovereign
can do his subjects no injustice or injury, a subject nevertheless has the right to resist if the
sovereign comes to kill him, injure him, or place him in chains. THOMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN
ch �4, §8 & §29; see also ch. 21, § 12, §13, & §15.
14. There may nevertheless be grounds for drawing a rough distinction between rights and
liberties in Hobbes's account. It would be the distinction between entitlements in civil society
(whether themselves natural or civil) and the entitlement each has in a state of nature to
advance his own survival. The former have characteristics that make them right-like in a
modern sense, while the latter is a mere absence of restraint.
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simple reason: Pushing a person off the plank is killing him, and people
generally have a right that others not kill them. That is, killing another
human being is not something we are at liberty to do. But does the claim
that we are not at liberty to kill not conflict with the suggestion that each
may push the other off the plank? And so if we deny the possibility that each
has a liberty to push the other off the plank, are we not also denying that it
is permissible for each to do so? Not necessarily. Sometimes it is permissible
to kill someone who has a right not to be killed, namely when one has a
justification for killing. In such cases, the privilege one person has to kill
overrides the other person's right not to be killed. When might this be so?
One situation might be if there were great utilitarian gains from killing, so
that many more people would be saved than lost. Another might be if the
agent must kill to protect a right he has, and the right he is protecting is
more stringent than the other person's right not to be killed.15
Now in this case, we cannot be talking about the first sort of justification,
because there is no net savings of lives. So if it is pern1issible for each to push
the other off the plank, it must be because by doing so, each protects a right
he has, which right is more stringent than the other's right not to be killed.
What would be the argument that there is such a right, and what would
make us think it so stringent if it exists? The basic thought is that a person
whose life is in imminent danger has broad latitude to do what is necessary
to save his own life. While we normally do not think this includes making
use of another person's body who is not aggressing against us, as Pufendorf
argued, matters are different if the person he would kill is already destined
for death.I6 We might also note that by pushing the other person off the
plank, the agent is redistributing a harm that initially threatened two people
to one person instead. There are other ways of explaining the intuition that
it is permissible for each to push the other off the plank. It will no doubt
seem a failing to some that I do not defend this intuition in greater depth.
But I am not here so concerned to argue for the substantive claim of
permissibility as to make room for it by showing that the fact that the rights
are equal and conflicting does not give us reason in itself to reject the
assignment of right.
The contemporary rights theorist would side with Kant in denying that
each person has a right to push the other off the plank. If we leave aside
any substantive objections she might have to the claim that it is permissible
for each to favor his own life in such a case, what could be the basis for her
rejection of equal and opposing rights? The fact that an equal distribution
15. Notice that pushing the other off the plank is significantly different from merely
continuing to cling to the plank in this regard. For clinging to the plank is not killing someone;
it is merely failing to save. Assuming there is no duty to rescue in such a case, then the person
who continues to clingto the plank requires no special justification for doing so, and each is at
liberty to continue to cling even if it means the death of the other.

16. True, there is a scenario in which he is not destined for death, but this scenario would
require one to sacrifice oneself by relinquishing the plank, and surely there is no obligation to
do that.
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itself a reason to object to

the assignment, for, as I argued above, morality might turn out to be
inconsistent. So although avoiding inconsistency may be what motivates the
rights theorist to reject equal and conflicting rights, it cannot itself be an
adequate reason for doing so. Is there any other way she can rule out equal
conflicts of rights? One standard more would be to reject the claim I have
just made, namely that a permission to kill another person can operate in
the face of a contrary right on the part of that person not to be killed. That
is, the rights theorist typically does not think it possible for one person's
right to <p to coexist with another person's right that others refrain from
<p-ing. The rights theorist of course recognizes that sometimes people have
a right to kill and that humans are not normally at liberty to kill one
another. But, at least traditionally, she has explained such cases by saying
that the victim has forfeited the right not to be killed.I7 That, for example,
is typically what is said about self-defense: It is permissible for one person
to kill another in self-defense only on the assumption that the aggressor
forfeits the right not to be killed by attacking. Assuming that a person
innocently clinging to a plank has not forfeited his right not to be killed,
the rights theorist might say that no one could have a right to push him off
it. And so the rights theorist will have no choice but to deny the substantive
intuition and say that it is not permissible for either to push the other off
the plank.
It seems, then, that there are two ways we can treat the plank case. Either
we can allow that each person has a right not to be killed, but that each
person also has a right to push the other off the plank that overrides the
right of the other not to be killed. Or we can treat the right not to be killed
as incompatible with a right on the part of someone else to kill, in which
case, assuming neither on the plank has forfeited the right not to be killed,
it cannot be permissible for either to push the other off. I shall argue that
although the second approach is the more standard one in the theory of
rights, it is in fact quite problematic. My argument will proceed as follows.
First, I shall argue that if the rights theorist allows that rights can ever
conflict, she will have to allow that one person's right to push the other off
the plank can coexist with a non-forfeited right on that person's part not to
be killed. She will therefore have to allow that each person could have a
right to push the other off the plank, and that these rights are equal and
opposing. But what if the rights theorist attempts to deny the existence of
conflicts of rights of any sort? Second, then, I shall argue against the rights
theorist who thinks she can dispense with conflicts all together. I shall argue
that if the rights theorist tries to eliminate all conflicts from her theory of
rights, she will end up depriving the notion of a right of its efficacy in
judgments of moral permissibility.

17. This was Locke's view of the matter. JoHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT § 16
(C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980).
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Let us first turn to the rights theorist who allows that there can be
conflicts. Judy Thomson, for example, has a series of starving or otherwise
needy children whose survival interests are pitted against owners of n1eat
lockers or property owners who live next to hospitals. Consider the case in
which a child will die unless the parent trespasses on someone's land to get
to a hospital. IS Let us assume the reason the parent may trespass is that the
child has a

right to cross the land,

and the parent is facilitating the exercise

of that right.l9 The owner, on the other hand, has a right to exclude people
from his land, and this right extends to the parent with the sick child.20
Thomson seems willing to allow that there is a conflict between the child's
right to cross the land and the owner's right to exclude the child from the
land. She puts the point by saying that in crossing the land, the child

infringes,

but does not

violate,

the owner's right, given that the child has a

justification for crossing the land. But if the child's right to cross the land
can conflict with the property owner's right to exclude the child from the
land, there would be no reason in principle to reject the idea that one
person's right to push the other off the plank could conflict with the other's
right not to be killed. That is, if the fact that the property owner has a right
to exclude the child is not itself a reason for denying that the child has a
right to cross it, then how could the fact that each person has a right not to
be killed be a reason for denying that each has a right to push the other off
the plank? Indeed, we have no reason to think Thomson herself would deny
it. And if each person can have a right to push the other off the plank, and
if each person's right overrides the other's right not to be killed, then, since
we have no reason to favor one person's right over the other's, we do indeed
have equal and conflicting rights to push the other off the plank.
But we might imagine a rights theorist of Thomson's persuasion respond
ing that it is one thing to allow for a conflict of rights where one right
overrides the other, and quite another to allow for conflicts in which conflict
ing rights turn out to be in equipoise. (After all, it is rights in equipoise that
are most objectionable from the standpoint of inconsistency.) In particular,
here she might insist that the right each has not to be killed overrides the
right of the other to push him off the plank, just as the child's right to cross
the land overrides the property owner's right to exclude her. In this case, all
we would be left with is two prevailing rights not to be killed, which are not in
conflict with one another. Since the right each had to push the other off the
plank is overridden, neither would be permitted to push the other off. But
this would be a substantive argument about the strength of the respective
rights involved. There is no reason in principle that the right to push the
18. THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 105 & ff. (Harvard University Press 1990).
19. One could also say that the reason the parent may cross the land is that there are great
utilitarian gains from her doing so. But it seems as compelling, if not more so, if the child's
entitlement is based instead on a right she has, and I do not think Thomson would reject the
formulation.
20. Shortly we will consider a different version of the owner's right, one that allows him to
exclude everyone except the parent with the sick child.
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other off the plank should turn out to be so weak. Indeed, if the right to push
the other off the plank did lose out in a contest with the right each has not to
be killed, that would only really concede the possibility of equal conf1icts of
rights, since it would suggest the possibility of a different sort of case in which
the rights turned out to be in equipoise.21
What, then, if the rights theorist s;vitches strategies and tries to deny the
possibility of conf1icts of rights altogether? She might say that although it
appears that two rights are in conflict when one person's entitlement is
based on survival and another person's is based on ownership, there is in
fact no conflict. The stronger entitlement

exting1lishes

the weaker entitle

ment by making it ineligible to count as a right. If the rights theorist takes
this position, she will easily be able to deny that one person's right to kill
can conflict with another person's right to be killed, and so to deny that
each man clinging to the plank has a right to push the other off it. For to
say that each man has a right not to be killed would be tantamount to saying
that neither has a right to push the other off the plank. The rights theorist
would then once again conclude that neither man clinging to the plank is
permitted to push the other off it.
There are several different strategies the rights theorist could use to
eliminate conflicts. According to a view we might call Specification, while
the parent may have the right to cross someone's land to rush her sick child
to the hospital, the property owner's right to exclude people from his land
does not extend to a parent with a sick child. On this view, there is no need
to compare the two rights with regard to

strength

in order to resolve the

conflict. There is already an exception built into, say, the property owner's
right, which covers the case of the parent with the sick child. This approach
would apply to equal conflicts as well. In the plank case, for example, the
proponent of Specification could say that each person's right to the plank
already contains an exception for the case in which someone else's life
depends on using the same plank. Thus neither has a right to push the
other off the plank, since the right to preserve oneself by seizing the plank
for oneself contains an exception for another person's claim to self-preser
vation when the two cannot both be satisfied.
While cont1ict-dissolving approaches like Specification do successfully
eliminate conf1icts, they are not costless. Their main drawback is that in
determining whether someone has a right, one must first determine that
person's moral position relative to the positions of those with whom that
person would conf1ict. That is, such strategies determine whether it would
ultimately be permissible for the person to act as the right allows

before

21. There is an additional wrinkle here. It may seem otiose to speak of a right to push the
other off the plank if that right is overridden,just as it may seem otiose to speak of the child"s

right to cross the land when it is overridden. But it is not incoherent to speak of a right in either
case. The overridden right might continue to make itself felt: For example, if it were possible

g

for the victor in the stru gle over the plank to compensate the vanquished, he might well have
an obligation to do so.
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making the assignment of right. For example, in determining whether the
property owner has a right to exclude the sick child from his land, this view
first considers whether it is permissible for the owner to exclude the child, in
order to decide whether there is an exception to the owner's right of
exclusion . But then it is difficult to see what work the notion of a right is
doing. For the judgment about the strength of the underlying claims can
itself tell us what it is permissible to do-it could, for example, tell us that
the sick child may cross the land. The fact that the child has a right to cross
the land is not itself doing any work towards the conclusion that the child
may cross it. 22 So on this view, it will not be possible for us to explain why
agents may do various things in terms of the fact that they have rights.
I have argued that each man clinging to the plank has a right to push the
other off it. A familiar line in contemporary rights theory, however, would
deny this on the grounds that each also has a right not to be killed, and that
the two rights are not compatible. I have argued against this response in two
stages : First if the rights theorist allows that there can sometimes be conflicts
of rights, then she cannot in principle deny the possibility that each person
has a right to push the other off. Whether there is such a right, and what its
strength is relative to other rights, is entirely a substan tive matter. It is not
one that can be ruled out on structural grounds. Second, if the rights
theorist instead tries to deny that rights can ever conflict, she will encounter
a further problem. Presumably she wishes rights to have an independent
bearing in moral assessment, so that they might co ntribute to judgme nts of
moral permissibility. But the strategies available to her to eliminate conflicts
all determine the existence of a right in terms of the relative strength of the
underlying claims. And once the relative strengths of the underlying claims
have been settled, there is no longer any need for the assignment of rights .
For any question of permissibility can be answered by examining the claims
on which the assignment of rights is based. For this reason, on the view that
would eliminate conflicts, rights cannot themselves contribute to judgments
of moral permissibili ty.

Ill. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS AND INCONSISTENCY
If each person has a right to push the other off the plank, there is indeed
a threat that morality is inconsistent. For we can then reason as follows:
1. I have a right to push you off the plank.
2. You have a right to push me off the plank.

22. Thomson appears to agree. She complains that on the "no conflicts" view, the rights a
person has are settled by what it is permissible for people to do. Thomson, Rights and
Compensation, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RisK at 70 (William Parent, ed., Harvard University
Press 1986). She says that "to take this line is to commit oneself to the view that rights do not
have an independent bearing in moral assessment of action." Jd.
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3. You have a right to push me off the plank :) I have a duty to refrain from
interfering with your right to push me off the plank
4. Pushing you off the plank would interfere with your right to push me off the
plank.
5. I have a duty to refrain from pushing you off the plank.
6. I have a right to push you off the plank :)
{I have a duty to refrain from
pushing you off the plank}.
�

:. {I have a duty to refrain from pushing you off the plank}
{I have a duty to refrain from pushing you off the plank},

A

"'

a contradiction.
The first thing I wish to do is head off an objection to premise 4. Why,
someone might say, does my pushing you off interfere with your pushing me
off? Could each of us exercise our rights to push each other off simultane
ously, without either of us interfering with the other person's right to do the
same? If the right really were just the right to push the other off the plank,
of course we could. But the right is shorthand for a more extensive right,
namely the right to dispossess the other to obtain exclusive control of the
plank for oneself. And this is truly a right that cannot be exercised without
interfering with the other party's exercise of the same right. So when I say
that each person has a right to push the other off the plank, let us read, "the
right to gain exclusive control of the plank by dispossessing the other." For
simplicity's sake, I will just speak of the "right to push the other off the
plank."
The crucial premises are 3 and 6. Each of these represents a standard
assumption of the modern understanding of rights and duties. It is when
these two assumptions are combined with a conflict of rights that we have
inconsistency. The question we must now ask is whether we can reject either
assumption.
Premise 3 is arguably the most central defining characteristic of the
modern approach to rights, namely the correlativity of rights and duties.
Let us call it the "Correlativity Thesis."
The Correlativity Thesis. If I have a right, there is at least one person who has a duty
that corresponds to my right.

My formulation of the Correlativity Thesis is deliberately vague in order to
accommodate the many different forms the right and the corresponding
duty can take. The right can be a right to do something, a right not to do
something, or even just a right to a thing. The duty, accordingly, can be a
duty not to interfere with a person's doing something, a duty not to force a
person to do something, or a right to do or to refrain from doing some
thing. For example, if you promise to pay me ten dollars in exchange for
some service I render you, you create a right in me to receive ten dollars,
and place yourself under a duty to pay me the ten dollars. My right to
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receive ten dollars is correlated with a duty on your part to pay it. In this
case there appears to be an analytic connection between my right and your
duty: Saying that I have a right as against you to receive ten dollars just means
that you have a duty to pay me ten dollars. In other cases, however, the
relation between the right and the duty is more attenuated. If the property
owner has the right to exclude people from his property, on whom does the
correlative duty fall? Hohfeld suggested it falls on each and every person
who might attempt to cross the land.23 But in this case as well, it is part of
what we mean when we say the property owner has a right to exclude people
from his land that at least some others have a duty not to cross the land.
It seems unlikely that we can dispense with the Correlativity Thesis and
still be articulating a theory of rights. In particular, without the connection
with duty, we will fall prey to Hobbes's problem and end up collapsing rights
into liberties. For what would it mean to say that I have a right to be paid
ten dollars by you if you do not have a duty to pay me? Even where the
relation between the right and the duty is more attenuated, it is hard to see
what having a right would amount to if it were not correlated with a duty.
Would it really make sense to say that the property owner had a right to
exclude people from his land if it turned out that no one had a duty to
refrain from crossing his land? So I think that we cannot dispense with the
correlativity of rights and duties without fundamentally changing the sub
ject: A right without a correlative duty is simply not a right.

Let us now turn to premise 6, the premise that moves from the existence
of a right to do something to the absence of a duty to refrain from doing it.
Like premise 3, this premise also seems to be essential to the nature of
rights, and it is hard to see why one would want to question it. Indeed, it
seems to enjoy a kind of axiomatic status in the modern conception of
rights. We might articulate it as follows:

The Right-Duty Principle. If I have a right to do something, then I have no duty to
refrain from doing it.
The Right-Duty Principle is based on an intuition that I take to be common
in the theory of rights, namely that if a person has a right to do something,
it is permissible for her to do it. For assuming that it is permissible for a
person to do something if she has no duty not to do it, then saying that a
right to <p is incompatible with a duty not to <p says precisely that. Like
Correlativity, it is hard to see how we would still be articulating our common
understanding of a right if we denied this thesis. Imagine someone told you
he had a right to make as much noise as he wanted, but he nevertheless had

23. WESLEY NEWCOMBE HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS

AS

APPLIED IN jUDICIAL

REAsONING 91-96 (Yale University Press 1923). Others think it more general than that, namely

that it is a right against the whole world rather than a right against each individual person in
that world. But Hohfeld restricted rights against the whole world to a "right in rem," namely a
right in a thing rather than a right that someone

do something or refrain from doing something.
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a duty to be silent. One might think he did not know what it means to say
a person has a right.
The problem with combining the assumption of conflicts of rights with
the above two principles can be brought out rather swiftly. Return to the
property owner with the right to exclude people from his land. We said that
the property owner has a right to exclude the sick child even if the child's
right to cross the land overrides that right. If the child's right overrides the
property owner's right, then it looks as though we ought to say (assuming
correlativity) that the child's right to cross the land places the property
owner under a duty to refrain from excluding her. The property owner, for
example, may not quickly lock the gate when he sees the child coming, or
tell his security guards to expel the child as she tries to cross the land. So
although the property owner has a right, he also has a duty to refrain from
exercising the right. What this shows us is that if rights can conflict, then
either rights cannot impose duties on others (and premise 3 is false), or
having a right cannot be incompatible with having a duty to refrain from
acting on the right (and premise 6 is false).
Suppose, then, we deny that rights impose duties, that is, deny Correla
tivity (premise 3). We would then, for example, deny that the property
owner has a duty to refrain from trying to exclude the child, even assuming
that his right to exclude her is overridden by her right. That is, someone
might want to argue that it

is permissible

for him to tell his security guards

to evict the child when she tries to cross his land. We would then be treating
any conflict of rights as a conflict down to the ground: Saying a person has
a right to something or to do something would mean that she is entitled to
act on the right even if the right is overridden by a stronger right. And this
would allow us to retain the compatibility of a right with an absence of duty
and so to preserve the Right-Duty Principle. But this approach seems
problematic. One reason is that it then seems hard to explain what we mean
when we say that the child's right is

stronger than the property owner's right.

Doesn't saying that the child's right is stronger mean that the child's right
should win out? But in what sense does the child's right win out if the
property owner may simply proceed as though she did not in fact have the
right to cross his land in the first place? We

could locate

the superior status

of the child's right in the position of a third party: Arguably, if the child's
right overrides the property owner's right, a third party should be permitted
to assist the child but not the property owner. But while this seems to be
true, it would be odd to think a third party constrained from assisting the
property owner if the latter were not constrained himself.
The alternative is simply to accept that the property owner can have a
right to exclude the child compatibly with having a duty not to exercise
that right. That is, the alternative is to reject the Right-Duty Principle
(premise 6) and say that it is perfectly possible for tl1e property owner to
have a right to exclude the child from his land at the same time that he
has a duty not to exercise the right. The first problem we will encounter
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if we go this route is that it will require that we reject another principle ,
one that is also usually assumed in discussions of rights.
The Right-Liberty Principle. If I have a right to q>, then I an1 at liberty to q>.

Why does rejecting the Right-Duty Principle entail rejecting the Right-Lib
erty Principle? Assume that a liberty is an absence of a duty not to do, as we
did initially. If I have a liberty to <p, that means I do not have a duty to refrain
from <p-ing. But if a right can coexist with a duty not to do, then a right
cannot entail a liberty. The question , then, is whether we can accept this
conclusion. 2 4 One reason not to accept it is the following. A liber ty implies
that a person has no duty to refrain from doing what she is at liberty to do.
But if a right can coexist with a duty not to act as the right allows, then oddly
it looks as though a right is weaker than a comparable liberty. Having a
right, on this view, would be compatible with its being impermissible to act
on the right. This would not be true of a liberty. So one problem with
rejecting the Right-Du ty Principle is that it seems to be making an assign
ment of right less significant than an assignment of a liberty.
We have now mapped out the terrain in its entire ty. We have seen that the
problem of inconsistency is a product of three assu mptions: First, that rights
can conflict; second, that rights are correlated with duties; and third, that a
right entails an absence of a duty not to act as the right allows. We have seen
that it would be extremely difficult to reject any of these assumptions. The
first see ms necessary if rights are to do any work in judgments of moral per
missibili ty, and the other two seem to be essential pre mises in articulating our
common conception of rights. But we have shown that although any two of
these assumptions are c o mpatible with one another, we cannot assume all
three together without also accepting that morality is inconsistent. Assuming
that we are not prepared to do that, we must choose which of the three to reject. We should notic e , moreover, that we did not need the assumption of
equal conpicts of rights to come to this conclusion. Even unequal conflicts
produce the difficulty, because the bearer of the weaker right will clearly have
a duty not to act on his right, given that it is overridden , if rights are ever cor
related with duties.
In considering this problem, i t may help to turn to the problem of
inconsistency in another context, namely that of conflicting obligations. For
there have been a number of suggestions for avoiding the inconsistency
produced by allowing that obligations can conflict. My hope is that one of
them may prove of use in thinking about conflicts of rights . In the next
section, I shall argue that one solution in particular is helpful in the arena
of conflicting duties, namely the solution that rejects the "agglomerativity"
of duties. In Section V, I shall return to the problem of conflicting rights ,

24. Joel Feinberg, for example, explicitly rejects it, since he insists that a right entails a
liberty. Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights,]. VALUE INQUIRY 4 (1970).
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and I shall argue that the equivalent of the non-agglomerativity of duties on
the rights side will be the rejection of the Right-Duty Principle.

IV. I NCON S I STE NCY AND MORAL DILEMMAS
The problem of inconsistency has been explored extensively in the litera
ture on moral dilemmas. Suppose, to take a shopworn example, I promise
Michael a banana and I promise Heidi a banana, and to my horror I
discover that I have only one banana. To eliminate any possible under
brush, let us say I make promises to them simultaneously, for example in a
joint e-mail. Neither Michael nor Heidi can claim priority over the banana.
What am I to do?
I could begin by asking if either Michael or Heidi will release me from
my obligation. But assuming that neither will give me a release, there seems
to be no way to avoid breaching my obligation to someone. Alternatively, if
I have a way of compensating one of them, say Michael, I should give the
banana to the other, namely Heidi. But that does not solve my problem, for
it remains the case that I have violated my duty to Michael in favor of
satisfying my duty to Heidi. If it is the case that whatever I do I will end up
violating an obligation to

someone,

then morality must be inconsistent. For

the following argument seems correct in that case.
1. I have a duty to give Michael a banana.
2. I have a duty to give Heidi a banana.
3. I cannot give Michael and Heidi both a banana.
4. Ought to <p=> Can <p.
5. Cannot {give Michael and Heidi a banana} => ---- Ought {give Michael and
Heidi a banana}.

6. I have a duty to give Michael a banana=> I ought to give Michael a banana.
7. I have a duty to give Heidi a banana=> I ought to give Heidi a banana.
8. Ought {give Michael a banana}

A Ought

{give Heidi a banana} => Ought {give

Michael and give Heidi each a banana}.
:.Ought {give Michael and give Heidi a banana}.
A--

Ought {give Michael and Heidi a banana}.

If people can have conflicting obligations, then morality may turn out to be
inconsistent in the same way we observed with conflicting rights.
There is by now a standard litany of responses to this problem. Most of
the answers are designed to dispel the sense of conflict, that is, to suggest
that I need not violate one or the other of my obligations. We .11ave already
seen one of the responses in the context of conflicts of rights. That view,
called Specification, says in this context that I did not really promise Mi
chael and Heidi each a banana. Instead I promised Michael a banana-if-I
had-one-assuming-I-made-reasonable-efforts-to-obtain-one. Similarly, I did
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not promise Heidi a banana. Instead, I promised her a banana-if-I-had-one
assuming-I-made-reasonable-efforts-to-o btain-one. Assuming I did make
reasonable efforts to obtain two bananas, I do not violate my obligation to
one when I give the banana to the other. Specification would thus resolve
the problem by rejecting premises 1 and 2.
A second view, let us call it Prima Facie, says that when I promised each a
banana, I acquired only a prima facie duty to give each a banana. I did not
acquire an all-things-considered obligation to give a banana to Heidi and to
give a banana to Michael. Among other things, ought implies can, and I
cannot give a banana to both Michael and Heidi.25 This view allows that I can
have conflicting prima facie duties, but it denies the possibility of all-things
considered conflicts. This solution would thus also reject 1 and 2, calling the
duties in question prima facie rather than all-things-considered duties. If
"ought" in premises 6 and 7 tracks our all-things-considered obligations,
Prima Facie would say that it is not the case that I ought to give a banana to
either of them, since I have only a prima facie duty with respect to each.
A third view treats duties as disjunctive obligations; let us call it "Disjunc
tion." Disjunction maintains that there are two ways I can satisfY my obliga
tion to Michael: Either I can give him a banana, or I can pay him
compensation. I do not breach my duty to give him a banana if I compen
sate him instead. Disjunction thus rejects premises 1 and 2 as well. It says
that I have a duty {to give Michael a banana or to pay him compensation},
and the same with respect to my duty to Heidi in premise 2.
Yet another view drives a wedge in between a person's obligations (all
things considered) and what he ought to do (all things considered). Let us
call it the "No-Ought" view. It may be the case that I have an all-things-con
sidered duty to give Michael a banana because I have promised him one,
and that I have an all-things-considered duty to give Heidi a banana because
I have promised her one. Nevertheless, if I cannot satisfy both obligations,
it is not the case that I ought to satisfy both, because "ought" implies "can."
What I ought to do is to pick a good method for choosing one of the
obligations to fill (flip a coin or draw lots), and then try to pay the other
compensation. Unlike Disjunction, the No-Ought view does not maintain
that I can satisfy the obligation itself by paying compensation. Rather, if I
cannot satisfy the obligation, I ought to pay compensation, just as I ought to
apologize, ought to find an equitable way of distributing the banana, and so
on. But while in such a case I ought to give the banana to one and
compensate the other, it is still not the case that I ought to give the banana
to both. So the No-Ought view would reject premises 6 and 7, and as a
consequence 8. What I ought to do follows from some procedure for
choosing among my various duties.
There are serious and, as far as I can tell, unsolved difficulties with each of
25. Phillip Montague provides a compelling defense of this approach. Phillip Montague,
53 PHIL. STUD. 347-366 ( 1988).
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these views. A common objection to Specification is that it is not possible to
identify in advance the myriad situations in which an obligation is subject to
exception, and so not possible, on this view, to specify the exact nature of the
obligation itself. A second problem is that it leaves the "moral residue" of fail
ing to meet an obligation unaccounted for, meaning the ongoing obligation
to compensate or make amends to a person toward whom one has violated an
obligation. Suppose I have one banana and the monetary equivalent of a ba
nana, say a dollar. Am I not obligated to give the money to Michael if I give the
banana to Heidi? And if I have no way of compensating Michael, do I not at
the very least owe him an apology? If, however, I have not breached any duty
to Michael, then compensation, apologies, and any other way of making
amends are all unnecessary. But this does not square with the way we tend to
regard the duty to compensate in such a case.
Prima Facie is perhaps more promising, but whatever its other advantages,
I think it cannot solve the problem of conflicting duties that are in equipoise.
For if my obligation to give Michael the banana is exactly as strong as my
obligation to give Heidi the banana, the prima facie conflict between these
duties can never be resolved in favor of an all-things-considered duty to give
the banana to one or the other. By hypothesis, whatever consideration
applies to one will also apply to the other. Thus it looks as though either I
have an all-things-considered obligation to both-which makes the conflict
return-or I have only a prin1a facie obligation-which means I am not
really in the final analysis obligated to give either a banana. The first outcome
makes Prima Facie unhelpful and the second makes it anarchistic.
Prima Facie arguably also has difficulties accounting for moral residue.
On this view, as on Specification, I have no all-things-considered obligation
to the person to whom I deny the banana. So if I have a continuing moral
obligation of some sort, either it must be based on an unfulfilled all-things
considered obligation, or it must be based merely on an unfulfilled prima
facie obligation. If the proponent of Prima Facie takes the former position,
there can be no moral residue with respect to my breached obligation to
Michael if I give the banana to Heidi. If, on the other hand, he takes the
latter position, then any breach of duty would result in a continuing obliga
tion, perhaps with a duty to compensate.26 This would make the scope of
the moral residue too broad.
There are drawbacks to Disjunction as well. First, compensation is not
always possible. If instead of bananas we are divvying up lives, and I have an
26. Montague, however, points out that there are many such cases in which we do not think
compensation is owning, for example where Michael is himself the (culpable) cause of my
having only one banana. Id. Moreover, he suggests that moral residue does not always lead to

I might, for example, merely have a duty to explain my behavior to
I fail to give him the banana. But it seems to me that Prima Facie must then be

a duty to compensate.
Michael if

accompanied by a theory of when a failure to satisfY a prima facie obligation leaves moral
residue.

I myself do not see how the dissolution of conflicts of duties into reasons for and

against assertions of conclusive duties will square with our intuitions about moral responsibility
for breaches of duty.
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obligation to save each of two people and can save only one, I cannot
compensate the one I do not save. In this case, I breach an obligation
whatever I do. Even philosophers intent on denying the existence of both
conflicts of rights and conflicts of duties allow that there is a problem here.
Hillel Steiner, who otherwise denies the possibility of conflicts altogether,
says about this case: "I think I ' m going to have to concede that, if there isn't
[a way to redress either one] , then in this sort of double duty case-and only
in this sort of case-it's correct to describe my choice as defaulting on one of
my two enforcement duties. "27 But this is precisely what any serious moral
dilemma looks like. Think of Sophie, who is required to give up one of her
children to the Nazis on pain of having both killed. She has an obligation to
each child, let us assume, to save him, and no way of meeting both of these
obligations. There is no way of compensating the child she fails to save. In
this case, there would be a conflict of duties, and it would not be possible to
satisfy one duty without breaching the other. The curious implication of
Disjunction, then, is that a person's moral standing may depend on the
contingent fact of whether the obligation he breaches is of the compensable
variety. On this view, people who restrict themselves to promises involving
bananas, rather than lives, are likely to end up in better moral standing.
Second, a regress threatens. If I have a duty to compensate Michael for
failing to give him a banana, what happens if I fail to compensate him?
Since compensation is itself a duty under these circumstances, it looks as
though I could satisfy my duty to compensate him by compensating him
for failing to compensate him. But what is the compensation owed for
breaching a duty to compensate? And what is the compensation owed for
breaching that duty? Does the person in breach owe interest for each
subsequent duty breached? Or does the value of the duty violated decrease
with each iteration? And what is the "statute of limitations" on compensat
ing for breaches of duties to compensate? Can I not avoid being in breach
simply by endlessly intending each time to compensate for the previous
duty breached?
The No-Ought view strikes me as closer to the mark, and indeed the
solution to which I am drawn has much in common with it. But I neverthe
less find the No-Ought view a bit mysterious. If its proponent is willing to
say that an agent can be simultaneously obligated to A and obligated to B,
where A and B cannot both be done, then why not say the difficulty lies in
the fact that people ought in general to honor their obligations, in conjunc
tion with the fact that the agent has two obligations and cannot satisfy them
both? More importantly, it still is not clear how the No-Ought view proposes
to deal with conflicting obligations in equipoise. If the obligation to A and
the obligation to B are of equal strength, then if I ought to A, it looks as
though it is also true that I ought to B. Once again, the conflict reemerges
at the level of ought. Finally, this view also seems to have a problem with
27. HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (Blackwell l994) .
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moral residue. For it is hard to see on this account why compensation
should be made for a breached obligation. If it is not the case that I ought
to keep my obligation to Michael, then why ought I to pay him compensa
tion? Why do I have to make amends for failing to do something that it is
not the case that I ought to do?
The alternative to these various accounts is to accept the conflict of duties
as in some sense ineliminable. That is, some philosophers accept that
morality can require agents to embark on one course of action at the same
time that it requires them to embark on another, where the two cannot both
be done. Some think that this supports skeptical or relativist conclusions
about morality, because it shows that morality cannot be thought of as
anything like a system or code. But others think that moral dilemmas do
not entail inconsistency in morals.
In an early piece on moral dilemmas, Bernard Williams points out that
the supposed inconsistency is not strictly a product of the fact that I have
an obligation to A and I have an obligation to B, and A and B are incom
patible. 28 For there is no inconsistency unless the two obligations are con
joined in the assertion that I have an obligation to {A A B}. He thus suggests
that we reject the "agglomerativity principle." From the fac t that I have
two distinct obligations, we cannot necessarily conclude that I have an
obligation to carry out their conjunction . Bas Van Fraassen makes what I
take to be a similar suggestion. 29 He proposes that "it ought to be the case
that A" is true if and only if there is an imperative in force that would not
be fulfilled if not-A were also true. Thus there is no logical contradiction
if someone has both an obligation to A and an obligation to B, where A
and B are mutually exclusive, if there are two separate imperatives in force
that correspond to each obligation: A provides the conditions under which
the first imperative is satisfied, and B provides the conditions under which
the second imperative is satisfied, but there is no imperative for which {A
A B} provides the conditions of satisfaction . Thus the solution that rejects
agglomerativity would accept the above argument intact, with the excep
tion of premise 8. That is, from the fact that I have an all-things-considered
duty to give Michael and Heidi each a banana, and that I ought to give
each a banana, it does not follow that I ought to give both of them a
banana. Indeed, we know that it is not the case that I ought to give both
of them a banana, since we can infer it from the fact that I cannot give
both a banana.
In the next section, I shall attempt to exploit this suggestion in the
context of conflicts of rights. My thought is that just as obligations are not
agglomerative , rights are not either. This will no doubt seem a strange
suggestion, for unlike in the case of obligations, there is no single person
who could be in possession of a right that combines each party's separate

28. Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency and Moral Dilemmas, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF
(Cambridge University Press 1973).
29. Bas Van Fraassen, Values and the Heart 's Command, 70 J. PHIL. 5-19 (1973).
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right to push the other off the plank. But I am nevertheless inclined to think
that the reason the modern conception of rights cannot accommodate
unresolvable conflicts is that it in effect attempts to agglomerate them: It
treats the question of conflicting entitlements as a case of a single, compos
ite right, just waiting to be distributed. But rights are not composite; they
arise independently, and so there is no guarantee that they will not conflict.
The fact that one person has a right thus does not entail that no other
person has a right that conflicts with it. V\That exactly it will mean to say that
rights are non-composite, however, is far from obvious.

V. N O N -AGG LOME RATIV ITY A N D RIG HTS
So far we have noted only the fact that both conflicts of rights and moral
dilemmas appear to lead to inconsistency. We have also noted that the same
moves are available in both literatures to try to eliminate the conflict: The
various conflict-dissolving approaches we considered in the context of
moral

dilemmas-Specification,

Prima

Facie,

Disjunction,

and

No

Ought-have all been argued for as often in the context of conflicts of
rights as they have in the context of moral dilemmas. These do not by
themselves seem adequate grounds for thinking that a solution to moral
dilemmas would be applicable to conflicts of rights. There is, however,
something that makes the hypothesis of a shared solution for conflicting
rights and duties more compelling. This is the fact that it is possible to

embed

a conflict of rights in a moral dilemma, in such a way that the solution to
the one seems to imply a solution to the other. All we have to do is to take
a conflict of rights and add a third party who is equally obligated to each of
the two combatants. In such a case, we can assume parity of solution
between the moral dilemma and its embedded conflict of rights: If a third
party watching us struggling over the plank, for example,

ought to

save me

at your expense, then my right should triumph over yours. If, on the other
hand, he

ought to

save you at my expense, then your right should triumph

over mine. And presumably if the third party is equally obliged to save both
of us, then neither of us is obligated to cede to the other.
My argument will be that if we can think of a third party to a conflict of
rights as having two separate, conflicting, and ineliminable duties, we can
also think of the rights on which each of these duties is based as remaining
intact. If neither duty extinguishes the other, then neither right should
extinguish the other. So if non-agglomeration allows us to retain both
duties without using one to cancel out the other, non-agglomeration
should also allow us to retain both rights. But what concretely does reject
ing agglomerativity mean for the embedded conflict of rights? Let us re
turn to the argument that produced an inconsistency in the case of a
conflict of rights.
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1 . I have a right to push you off the plank.
2. You have a right to push me off the plank.
3. You have a right to push me off the plank ::) I have a duty to refrain from
interfering with your right to push me off the plank.

4. Pushing you off the plank would interfere with your right to push me off the
plank.

5. I have a duty to refrain from pushing you off the plank.
6. I have a right to push you off the plank ::) "' {I have a duty to refrain from
pushing you off the plank}.

. ·.

1\

{I have a duty to refrain from pushing you off the plank
"'

{I have a duty to refrain from pushing you off the plank}.

Notice that one cannot apply non-agglomeration to the conclusion itself in
order to solve the inconsistency. For the conclusion of the argument is of
the form A A "' A, which truly cannot be accepted without rendering morality
inconsistent. The form of contradiction that non-agglomerativity solves is a
proposition of the form Duty A A Duty { -- A}, or, as we had before, Ought A
A Ought {-- A}, which is consistent as long as the two conjuncts are not
combined into Ought {A A "' A} . The only reason we were able to eliminate
the inconsistency in the case of the moral dilemma, whose conclusion was
also of the form Ought A and ""' Ought A, was that one of the steps in
deriving that inconsistency was of the form Ought {A /\'"'"' A} . We were able
to reject this premise by rejecting agglomerativity.
Let us n ow see if we can make the non-agglomerativity solution appli
cable to rights by adding a third party. Imagine that in the original plank
case there is a lifeguard who is watching us struggling over the plank. The
lifeguard, let us say, is obligated to save me and he is obligated to save
you. And let us also imagine that the only way he can save either of us is
to push the other off the plank with a long pole he happens to have .
Applying the Correlativity Thesis, we can say that the lifeguard's duty to
secure the plank for each of us is a function of the right each of us has
to use the plank for our own survival. Here is a representation of the
lifeguard 's situation :
1. I have a right to push you off the plank ::) Lifeguard has a duty to secure the
plank for

me.

2. You have a right to push me off the plank ::) Lifeguard has a duty to secure
the plank for you.

3. Lifeguard cannot secure the plank for both you and for me.
4. Ought to q> ::) Can q>
5. Cannot {secure the plank for you and me} ::) -- Ought {to secure the plank
for you and for me}.

6. Lifeguard has a duty to secure the plank for me ::) Lifeguard ought to secure
the plank for me.

7.

Lifeguard has a duty to secure the plank for you ::) Lifeguard ought to secure
the plank for you.
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8. Ought {secure the plank for me} 1\ Ought {secure the plank for you} :::J Ought
{secure the plank for you and me}.

:. Ought {secure the plank for you and for me}.
1\ -

30

Ought { secure the plank for you and for me}.

At the level of the conflict of rights, we eliminate the inconsistency by rejecting the agglomerativity of duties in step 8. We thus conclude simply that
the lifeguard ought to secure the plank for me and the lifeguard ought to se
cure the plank for you. That he ought to do each of these things is based on
the duty he has to each of us. And the duty he has to each of us is based on the
right each of us has to use the plank for our own survival. So we each have a
separate right to the plank, and based on that right, the lifeguard has a sepa
rate duty to each of us. What he does

not have is a duty to save both of us, con

joined from the duties he has to save each of us.
How exactly does this help us with our original inconsistency, the one that
we had before we embedded the conflict of rights in a moral dilemma? It
turns out that if we reject agglomerativity, we have also implicitly rejected

either Correlativity or the Right-Duty

Principle. For if the lifeguard can have

a duty to rescue me, when you have a right that he rescue you, then we must
say either of two things: Either your right that the lifeguard rescue you does
not place the lifeguard under a duty to rescue you (violating Correlativity) ,
or your right that the lifeguard rescue you does place him under a duty to
rescue you, but the fact that he has that duty does not preclude my having
a right that he rescue me instead ( violating Right-Duty) . This confirms the
conclusion we reached in Section III, namely that assuming rights can
conflict, we must choose to reject either Correlativity or Right-Duty if we
wish to avoid inconsistency. Which one, then, should we reject? I shall argue
that the better solution is to retain Correlativity and reject Right-Duty. I
have no arguments to add in favor of Correlativity over and above those I
made in Section III. I shall have to make my case, then, by trying to show
that we have ample reason to reject Right-Duty. Because I think we cannot
reject Correlativity and we must reject Right-Duty, I understand rejecting
agglomerativity in duties to translate into a rejection of Right-Duty in rights.
We should begin by asking ourselves why the Right-Duty Principle
seemed so plausible initially. That principle seemed plausible because we
assume, in general, that if a person has a duty to refrain from doing
something, it is not permissible for him to do it. We therefore thought that
a right to <p could not possibly be compatible with a duty to refrain from
<p-ing, because then the fact that a person had a right could not possibly
make it permissible for him to <p. So we were implicitly assuming another
principle that is quite central to the modern rights theorist.
30. Here I have framed the inconsistency in terms of ought rather than duty, simply to keep
the parallel with the case of the moral dilemma, which relies on the Ought-implies-Can
Principle.
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The Ought-Duty Principle. I f I have a duty t o d o something, and n o duty t o refrain
from doing it, then, all things considered, I ought to do it.
It was an implicit commitment to this principle that made the Right-Duty
Principle seem necessary and obviously correct.
But there are good grounds for thinking that the Ought-Duty Principle
is false. First, consider the following counterexample. Sometimes it is per
missible not to act on a duty for the sake of a sup "'rerogator y act. I have
promised to meet you for coffee, and I have thereby .ncurred a duty to do
so. But on my way to the coffee shop, a child is hit by a car, and only I can
rescue her. I have no obligation to rescue the child, b ut we nevertheless
think it permissible for me to do so instead of meeting you for coffee. 31
While I have a duty to meet you for coffee, it is clearly permissible for me
to violate that duty, even though the act I perform instead does not itself
represent the fulfillment of a duty. So the fact that I have a duty, and no
countervailing duty, still does not entail that adhering to the duty is what I

ought to do.
The implications for the Right-Duty Principle can be directly drawn: If I
may turn away from a duty to perform a supererogatory act, it seems
reasonable to think that I may do so in order to exercise a right. For surely
I have a greater claim to exercise a right than to perform a purely benefi
cent act I have no right and no duty to perform. It therefore looks as though
it may sometimes be permissible for me to exercise a right rather than
adhere to a duty. If this is true, then the Right-Duty Principle is also false.
In this way, the falsity of the Ought-Duty Principle should lead us to reject
the Right-Duty Principle as well.
Here is a second argument against the Ought-Duty Principle. If that
principle were correct, it would turn out that we could not allow for
conflicts of rights and also allow that a person in such a conflict may
sometimes

act on a right. And while this is not dispositive, because we could

always deny that there are ever any conflicts of rights, it is compelling if we
also have good reasons for allowing that there are conflicts of rights. Here
is why. Normally we think of rights as waivable. Indeed, it is often part of the
test for calling something a right that it can be waived. If the sick child truly
has a right to cross the owner' s land, then she may, but need not, cross the
land. If the owner has a right to exclude people from his property, then he

may, but need not, exclude people from his property. But if rights are

3 1. Frances Kamm has pointed out in an extremely interesting paper that this should cast
doubt on the strength of the obligation itself. Suppose I were faced with a choice between
rescuing the child and watching a football game. In this case, to say I have no duty to rescue
the child means that it would be perfectly permissible to choose the football game over the
rescue. But to say I have an obligation to meet you for coffee means that it would not be
acceptable for me to sit home watching a football game rather than meet you for coffee. If I
may rescue the child rather than meet you for coffee, however, and I may watch football rather
than rescue the child, then why may I not watch football rather than meet you for coffee?
FRANCES KAMM, 2 MoRALITY, MORTALITY (Oxford University Press 1996) ch. 12.
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waivable, then a person ought always to side with a duty rather than with a
right. That is, in a case of conflict, each person can satisfy all of his obliga
tions and violate no one's rights only if each waives the right that conflicts
with the other party's right. Similarly, although we might say that each
person has a right to push the other off the plank, we also must conclude
that neither may act on his right and, consequently, that neither may push
the other off. For it looks as though each person on the plank can satisfy all
his obligations and violate no one's rights by waiving the right he has to
push the other off it.
This, however, leads to peculiar results. For if the child's right is stronger
than the landowner's, for example, why should she be barred from acting
on it by the fact that the landowner has a right that conflicts with it? This
result will look even stranger in other cases, in particular, cases involving
third parties. Suppose there is a third party watching the sick child trying
to cross the property owner's land. And suppose the owner has built a big
fence. Might a third party not cut a hole in the fence to assist the parent
with the child? Or suppose the third party observes us struggling over the
plank in the modified case, knowing that I need it to live, but that you only
want it because you own it. Might the third party not shove you off the plank
in this case? According to the above logic, the third party still ought not
intervene, ought not cut the hole in the fence, ought not shove you off the
plank. For the third party would satisfy all her obligations and violate no
one's rights if she simply stayed out of the fray. But this seems quite
definitely to reach the wrong result. Sometimes it is permissible for a third
party to intervene in a conflict of rights, namely to assist the person with the
stronger right. The foregoing considerations strike me as sufficiently com
pelling to say that someone's having a duty to do something does not itself
entail that he ought to do it.
What this second argument shows is that if we wish to be able to say that
one person's right imposes a duty on another person, then we must also
have a way of saying that sometimes a person is not ultimately obligated to
act on the duty. That is, we must be able to say this if we also wish to allow
for conflicts of rights, because otherwise both people in a conflict would be
barred from acting on their rights. And once we have allowed that a person
could have a duty but not be obligated to act on that duty, we no longer
have any reason for denying that a person could have a right and a duty not
to act on the right. There would be no reason to deny this, because the
existence of the duty would not by itself make it impermissible to act on the
right.
Before we reject the Right-Duty Principle, however, recall that we had
reason to think doing so would lead to some highly counterintuitive results
in other domains. In particular, recall that rejecting the Right-Duty Princi
ple leads us ultimately to reject the Right-Liberty Principle and so ultimately
to break the connection between rights and permissions. We noted the odd
consequence that this makes a right seem stronger than a liberty, for a
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liberty entails a permission, but a right does not. I think, however, that we
can dispel this concern. For I would argue that we have as good a reason to
think this shows the strength of the notion of a right as to think it shows its
weakness. We could just as well put the point by saying that the notion of a
right persists even in the face of a prohibition on action. That is, we could just as
well say that a right is so strong that it continues to exist even when a
comparable liberty would be extinguished by the opposing duty. To say that
a right can conflict with a duty, then, may point to the ability of the notion
of a right to withstand opposition by duty.
Suppose, then, we do reject the following three principles: the Ought
Duty, the Right-Duty, and the Right-Liberty Principles. What, exactly, will we
say about cases of conflicting rights? The child and the property owner each
have rights-the child to cross the land, the property owner to exclude the
child from his land. Since we are retaining correlativity, each right imposes
a duty on the other not to interfere with the exercise of the right. In this
case, however, the child 's right to cross the land is more stringent than the
property owner's right to exclude the child. That means that the duty the
child's right imposes on the property owner is more stringent than the duty
the owner's right imposes on her. The result is that the child may cross the
land, and the property owner may not do anything to prevent her from
doing so. His right is overridden by her right and hence by the duty he has
not to act on his right.
There may seem to be a remaining problem, however, when we attempt
to apply this solution to the plank case. Since the right each has to push the
other off the plank is of equal strength, does that not suggest that these
rights do not override the duty each has not to interfere with the exercise
of right? Since the right to life each has is equally strong, how could the
right to push the other off the plank trump the other person's right not to
be killed? Are we not forced to conclude that each person's right to push
the other off the plank is exactly in equipoise with the other person's right
not to be killed? In Section II we considered an argument by the rights
theorist to the effect that the right not to be killed is actually stronger than
the right each has to push the other off the plank, as a strategy for defeating
the possibility of an equal conflict of rights. Our problem here is different,
because we are now prepared to allow equal conflicts. Our problem now is
that we seem to have reason to think that the sub-conflict-the conflict
between each person's right to push the other off the plank and the right
each has not to be killed-might itself be equal. And if this is so, then we
cannot think that the main conflict-the conflict between each person's
right to push the other off the plank-is compatible with thinking that each
may push the other off the plank.
But I would argue that each person has an agent-relative permission to
break the tie between the right he has and the duty he is under by favoring
his own right. That is, each person can prefer his own survival needs to the
survival needs of the other party and so choose to exercise his right over
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obeying his duty. We might put the point by saying that there is a discount
from the right to the corresponding duty, meaning that the duty I have not
to push you off the plank is a weaker echo of your right to push me off. But
I will not explore this idea further here. For the relative strengths of the
rights and duties is not a formal matter but one to be settled by substantive
principles of justice. Here I merely wish to indicate the direction in which
a solution to this substantive difficulty would lie.
Rejecting the Ought-Duty, the Right-Duty, and the Right-Liberty Princi
ples may seem a radical solution to the problem of inconsistency due to
conflict of rights. Nevertheless, I think it is not as radical as it may seem. For
all we have done by rejecting these principles is to make explicit what is
involved in saying that a right can be overridden yet remain in force. And
the "logic of override, " as we might call it, turns out to be pervasive in our
moral theory, even outside the area of rights. We talk, for example, about
having a good reason for breaking a promise or for violating a prohibition,
without thinking that the promise or the prohibition has no force under
the circumstances. We also talk about an exception to a rule, where the
exception dictates a different answer from the rule itself, without leading
us to find the rule inapplicable to the case.32 There are, to be sure, ethical
systems that reject the logic of override. Utilitarianism, at least act-utilitari
anism, cannot allow it, for if the only kind of reasons there can be are
reasons of utility, then any overriding reason must revise the underlying
prohibition. On the other end of the spectrum, a system of absolute prohi
bitions also cannot allow for a logic of override. For what it means to say a
prohibition is absolute is that it cannot be overridden. But any ethical
system that allows that there can be more than one sort of reason that
pertains to a possible action, one prohibiting the action and the other
permitting or recommending it, has implicitly accepted the logic of over
ride. For once we are committed to the idea that two different and conflict
ing sets of reasons can be "in force" simultaneously, we are also committed
to the idea that one of these sets of reason can be overridden.33
There seem to n1e to be other intuitive benefits to rejecting this trio of
principles. The first has to do with the issue of "moral residue. " By allowing
rights and opposing duties to coexist, we are able to say that a right is
overridden and still make sense of the moral residue the losing right exerts.
For example, the child may have a duty to compensate the property owner

32. For an argument that exceptions to rules involve conflicting background principles, see
Claire Finkelstein, tvhen the Rule Swallows the Exception, in RU LES AND REASONING: ESSAYS IN
Ho�OUR OF FREDERICK SCHACER (Hart Publishing Company 1999) (reprinted in 19 QUINN. L.
REv. 505 (2000)).
33. There are even theories of legal justification that deny the logic of override . Some
criminal law scholars, for example, think that a justification must be incorporated into the
prima facie prohibition. Instead of thinking of murder as intentional killing, with an exception
for self-defense, they want to think of murder as intentional-killing-not-in-self-defense. This is
not, however, the ordinary way in which the relation between rules of prohibition and justifi
cations are conceived.
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for any damage she causes in crossing the land. And if it were possible for
the winner in the struggle over the plank to compensate the loser, he would
have a duty to do so. In o ther words, we derive the same benefit for the
theory of rights from rejecting the above trio of principles that one obtains
from rejecting agglomerativity for the theory of duties. Both solutions deal
with the problem of inconsistency without extinguishing one side or the
other of the conflict. By enabling us to preserve the normative force of the
unsatisfied right or unfulfilled duty, they thus allow us to capture the sense
in which the situation is truly a conflict.
Finally, analyzing conflicts of rights in this way also gives us a better way
of understanding many ordinary cases than rights theorists have been able
to suggest so far. For example, we want to say that the right to self-defense
can make killing permissible in the face of a prohibition on killing. It seems
better to explain this by saying that the right in such cases overrides the duty
to refrain from doing what the right requires, than to try to find grounds
for claiming that the aggressor forfeits the right not to be killed. For there
are famous difficulties with the idea of forfeiture are here, chief among
them the fact that it is sometimes permissible to kill a person, like a child
or an insane person , whom we can only think of as having forfeited his right
with a great deal of distortion.

V I . CONC L U S I O N :
RESOLV I N G D I LEMMAS/CONFLICTS OF R I G HTS
The argument of the preceding five sections has been that conflicts of rights
do not necessarily lead to inconsistency. But the focus on inconsistency may
seem to leave out something crucial . For we still have no guidance on how
to resolve a conflict of rights. What should an agent who confronts such a
conflict actually do ? While it is not the point of this paper to suggest
anything like a method for resolving conflicts of rights or for acting in the
face of conflicts that are unresolvable, there may be some lessons for
practical reasoning we can draw.
Let us begin by asking what a person facing a moral dilemma ought to
do. Unfortunately, rejecting agglomerativity gives us no practical guidance.
I t only says that the person facing a moral dilen1ma is not faced with a
logical problem, whatever else he faces. I think, however, that we can infer
something about what morality requires in such a situation from our discus
sion so far. For if there are non-combinable moral imperatives, the choice
of which one to satisfy cannot be made through the application of moral
principles at all. If morality does not tell us what to do, then an 1 solution to
the problem is morally arbitrary, as long as we pick one of our obligations to
fulfill. (It is presumably worse to violate two moral duties than to violate
one.) In other words, in these cases, no second-order substantive principle
is available to resolve the first-order standoff. The only available principle
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of resolution is a procedural one, such as flipping a coin or just picking one
at random. Sophie , when forced to choose between her children, must
simply pick one, since she cannot resolve the matter on the basis of rational
principles. If she must "pick" rather than "choose , " it does not matter what
procedure she uses, because all are morally arbitrary. Any procedure she
might adopt is akin to flipping a coin.
In this way, a person who faces a choice between comparable alternatives,
where all the relevant principles are in equipoise, is arguably in the same
position as the person who faces a choice of incommen surable goods,
where the relevant principles cannot get a grip at all. To say that the goods
are incommen surable means that the agent cannot choose among them
according to principles of rationality. He must simply "pick" rather than
"choose . " And if this is correct, then any direction he takes is as good as any
other, as long as he takes some direction. For both agents, because there is
no superior outcome, there is no superior method for selecting one option
over the other.
What would it mean to say that parties to a conflict of rights should simply
"pick" rather than "choose"? It suggests that as in Sophie ' s case, any method
for resolving a conflict of rights will do, because it is morally arbitrary
whether one person wins the plank or the other does. The contestants for
the plank might decide to flip a coin or draw lots. They might find a neutral
judge to choose between them. Or they might just continue to do battle
until one person wins.
But, someone might say, are not the men clinging to the plank obligated
to flip a coin? This would, after all, return us to the earliest position on the
plank case-Hecato n ' s view that the parties are obligated to draw lots. In
Sophie ' s case, however, I suspect that she has no obligation to toss a coin to
decide between her two children, since any choice she makes between them
is already random, from a moral point of view. True, unlike Sophie, the men
clinging to the plank do not randomize their solution, because each will
prefer to assign the plank to himself. One might therefore think they have
an obligation to toss a coin or draw lots, even if Sophie does not. But I think
the men on the plank have no obligation to flip a coin or draw lots. For
nature has arranged her own lottery. If physical strength , wit, or luck assigns
the plank to one over the other, it is only as though God chose to resolve
his dilemma by flipping a coin.

